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REJOINDER: 
TW AILING INTERNATIONAL LAW 
James Thuo Gathii 
Brad Roth's response to my Review of his book seeks to privilege 
his approach to international law as the most defensible.1 His re­
sponse does not engage one of the central claims of my Review - that 
present within international legal scholarship and praxis is a simulta­
neous and dialectical coexistence of the dominant conservative/liberal 
approach with alternative or Third World approaches to thinking and 
writing international law. Roth calls these alternative approaches 
critical and does not consider them insightful for purposes of dealing 
with issues such as anticolonialism. Roth's characterization of my Re­
view as falling within critical approaches to international law seems 
too quick and, in fact, fits in very nicely with neoconservative dismiss­
als of the progressive left, and indeed, of Third World scholarship. 
For example, the rise of the Critical Race Theory movement in 
American legal academia received the sort of response that Roth gives 
to my Review.2 Roth defends his formalistic and doctrinaire approach 
to the study of international law, which is divorced from the social, his­
torical, and political context within which international law operates. 
In short, he defends international law as an iron cage of rules and doc­
trines as if the law was not itself a "crucial site for the production of 
ideology and the perpetuation of social power."3 
Such a view of international law, or indeed any social phenome­
non, simply elides the issues raised in my Review. Roth's characteri­
zation of my Review as "politically dysfunctional" epitomizes his fail­
ure to engage the pitfalls of formalist and doctrinaire thought in that it 
fails to engage the truism that states advance their interests, in part, 
through the medium of international law.4 It fails to debate whether 
international law is constitutive and not merely a reflection of the hi-
1. See Brad R. Roth, Governmental Illegitimacy and Neo-Colonialism: Response to Re· 
view By James Thuo Gathii, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2056 (2000). 
2. See, e.g., Jeffrey Rosen, The Blood and the Crits: 0. J. Simpson, Critical Race Theory, 
the Law, and the Triumph of Color in America, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 9, 1996, at 27. 
For examples of the writings of Critical Race Theorists, see CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE 
KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED TIIE MOVEMENT (Kimberle Crenshaw et al. eds., 1995). For 
an application of Critical Race Theory to International Law, see Ruth Gordon, Racing 
American Foreign Policy, Lecture at the Annual Meeting of the American Society of Inter­
national Law (April 2000). 
3. Introduction to CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE 
MOVEMENT, supra note 2, at xxiv. 
4. See Roth, supra note 1, at 2057. 
2066 
May 2000] Gathii's Rejoinder 2067 
erarchical character of international so�iety. As such, law does not 
stand outside the raw interests of states, ·but it produces those interests 
as much as it is the product of them. Consequently, the characteriza­
tion of my Review as politically dysfunctional is all the sadder since 
any fair reading suggests otherwise. If nothing else, I engage in a care­
ful and elaborate academic review of his book. I am not surprised, 
though, that Third World intellectuals receive little respect from some 
of their Western counterparts like Roth, even when they make credi­
ble intellectual contributions. In fact, Roth claims that his book is "far 
more effectively anti-colonial than ... [my] critique of it."5 What bet­
ter way of denying me a voice could there be? 
The essential point concerning the variety of Third World positions 
that I illustrate in my Review, and which Roth misses, is that Third 
World positions exist in opposition to, and as a limit on, the triumphal 
universalism of the liberal/conservative consensus in international law. 
In addition, these Third World positions are often shaped by the 
liberal/conservative consensus as much as the liberal/conservative ap­
proaches are shaped by countervailing Third World positions. A good 
example of this reciprocal definition of positions is the traditional 
liberal/conservative defense of the existing hierarchies of the interna­
tional political economy. This defense is based on two pretexts: that 
free enterprise is a given norm of the international economy and that 
the Third World has an interest in subverting hierarchies and displac­
ing free enterprise as a given norm of international economic relations. 
This dialectic of defense and subversion was exemplified by the New 
International Economic Order ("NIEO") in the 1970s. The liberal/ 
conservative consensus opposed the NIEO and defended free enter­
prise as a basic norm of international relations, in part on the basis 
that sovereignty was a political concept that could not extend to eco­
nomic relations between states. This position was defined in response 
to Third World challenges to foreign control over their natural re­
sources without adequate compensation. It was also defined in view 
of the unfair terms of international trade and commerce that devel­
oping countries experience. 
This example highlights my point. While the liberal/conservative 
position constructs the legal framework that is consistent with the 
hegemonic interests of the industrialized world, Third World positions 
challenge it and suggest, contrary to the liberal/conservative position, 
that a re-imagining or, indeed, revision of international economic and 
legal relations would not unduly destabilize international society. 
Third World scholars suggest that such a reformulation of interna­
tional law might instead be one part of a larger process of creatively 
5. Id. at 2057. 
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addressing issues of global justice and inequality.6 Although it may 
seem from this example that Third World Approaches to International 
Law ("TW AIL") are diametrically opposed to the liberal/conservative 
consensus, such a view understates the fact that aspects of each ap­
proach inter-penetrate each other. Such interpenetration generates 
creative tensions. For example, in foregrounding the interests of the 
industrialized economies, liberal/conservative positions are in tension 
with Third World Approaches that foreground the interests of the 
non-industrialized economies. These tensions are fruitful and cannot 
be ignored. As I stated in my Review, it is these new spaces generated 
by the interpenetration of the West and the non-West that takes us 
beyond the given grounds of opposition between Western liberalism 
and Western conservatism, or even between the West and the non­
West.7 These new spaces, in tum, create a new conceptual space for 
revision of accepted praxis, orthodoxies, and hierarchies (be they 
nonmaterial or material). These new spaces suggest that simply 
grounding or locating our struggles in doctrinal and formal categories 
is only part of a larger picture that cannot be completely subsumed by 
such categories outside of the social processes within which they oper­
ate. 8 
It is thus odd that Roth seems to make much of the point that his 
brand of analysis is superior because it does not, like mine, abandon 
"the very devices that give the poor and weak a modicum of lever­
age."9 Yet, Roth does not tell us the ways in which the norms and doc­
trines of international law preclude the very realization of these noble 
goals. Perhaps Roth should do better than engage in a selective and 
misleading characterization of not only my analysis, but of TW AIL 
scholarship as well. TW AIL scholarship, like allied approaches to the 
study of law, has a long tradition of examining the promises of such 
concepts as the norm of sovereign equality of states against the exist­
ing reality of economic hierarchy and subordination between nations. 
Such an analysis does not throw legal concepts overboard, but rather 
foregrounds the existing reality of economic hierarchy and subordina-
6. For some thoughts on this, see James Thuo Gathii, International Law and Eurocen· 
tricity, 9 EUR. J. lNT'L L. 184, 203-11 (1998) (reviewing SURYA PRAKASH SINHA, LEGAL 
POLYCENTRICITY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (1996) and SIBA N'ZATIOULA GROVOGUI, 
SOVEREIGNS, QUASI SOVEREIGNS, AND AFRICANS (1996)). 
7. See James Thuo Gathii, Neoliberalism, Colonialism and International Governance: 
Decentering the International Law of Governmental Legitimacy, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1996, 2001 
(2000) (reviewing BRAD R. ROTH, GOVERNMENTAL lLLEGmMACY IN INTERNATIONAL 
LAW (1999)). 
8. See James Thuo Gathii, Alternative and Critical: The Contribution of Research and 
Scholarship on Developing Countries to International Legal Theory, 41 HARV. INT'L L.J. 263 
(2000). 
9. Roth, supra note 1, at 2057. 
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tion between nations in relation to the norm of sovereign equality.10 It 
does not take any cleverness to do that and Third World scholars need 
not learn this from their Western counterparts. That law legitimizes 
oppressive social order is at the very center of my critique of Roth's 
failure to examine how international law de-legitimated non-Western 
societies as incapable of possessing sovereignty - an argument that 
laid the basis for colonial conquest. 
By contrast to this Third World position that expresses ambiva­
lence to international legal norms and doctrines, Roth regards his in­
ternational law of governmental illegitimacy as necessarily emancipa­
tory. He predicates this view on at least two propositions. First, 
governmental illegitimacy has the endorsement of Third World pro­
gressive leaders from whom Roth has "copiously" quoted. Such lead­
ers include Kwame Nkrumah, Raul Castro and Julius Nyerere.11 Sec­
ond, Roth states that he is interested in serving "to the extent possible, 
the long-term interests of the inhabitants of weak states."12 I do not 
challenge either proposition. Yet they are both predicated on the 
simplistic assumption that being "pro-small states" and "pro-left 
leaning Third World leaders" is as necessarily progressive as a defense 
of international legal norms and doctrines. For Roth, it is as if pro­
gressives are only those allied to his position. Roth seems to suggest 
that since I do not subscribe to his view of who a progressive is, I am 
necessarily reactionary.13 This is a curious claim since being in the 
company of Third World political leadership is hardly evidence of be­
ing avant garde or progressive.14 One only has to remember that 
barely ten years after the 1955 Non-Aligned Movement meeting in 
Bandung, Indonesia, a country that Roth has aligned himself with, 
forcibly put East Timor under its dictatorship. Hence, these responses 
are inadequate for at least two further reasons. First, they fail to en­
gage my primary criticisms of his book: its failure to engage the colo­
nial history of the international law of governmental illegitimacy and 
the underlying private order upon which governmental 
10. One of the best Third World articulations of this theme is MOHAMMED BEDJAOUI, 
TOWARDS A NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER (1979). According to Bedjaoui, 
"[t]raditional international law has helped to make independence a completely superficial 
phenomenon, beneath the surface of which the old forms of domination survive and the 
economic empires of the multinational corporations, and the powers that protect them, 
prosper." Id. at 81. 
11. See Roth, supra note 1, at 2064. 
12. Id. at 2061. 
13. See id. at 2064 (stating that "[i]n repudiating conventional legal analysis [which inci­
dentally I do not] as Eurocentric, Gathii dismisses both the significance of Third World par­
ticipation in shaping contemporary norms and the extent of the Third World's stake in the 
continued vitality of these norms - an attitude not, so far as I can tell, broadly shared 
among Third World leaders, scholars, or peoples."). 
14. For a trenchant expose of this position, see Ray Kiely, Third Worldist Relativism: A 
New Form of Imperialism, 25 J. CONTEMP. AsIA 159 (1995). 
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legitimacy/illegitimacy is predicated. Second, they are based on very 
simplistic assumptions about what is desirable for the Third World. 
These assumptions fail to take into account the complex relationship 
of normative and doctrinal work with the history of international law, 
and the oppressive reality over which international law gives credence 
at the expense of the Third World. 
The lack of engagement with colonialism and the private order 
that legitimates public power is not a problem specific to Roth, but 
rather one associated with the triumphal universalism of the liberal/ 
conservative approaches of which his book is a part. The disengage­
ment with these issues, in my view, characterizes an essential neo­
conservative realist position. Contrary to what Roth may think, I am 
not therefore mistaken in characterizing his book as a neo­
conservative realist approach to international law.15 To the extent that 
colonialism and the economics underlying the exercise of public power 
are not a part of the discussion about legitimacy, the task of engaging 
legitimacy is both incomplete and consistent with the hegemony of the 
industrialized countries and their allies over the rest of the World. 
The tragedy is that Roth perceives his project as striking a "blow for 
anticolonialism,"16 but his book epitomizes complicity with a Western 
discourse that silences issues of Western power, economic justice, and 
the very neocolonialism that Roth purports to oppose. Although I do 
not represent the Third World, I am from it. Needless to say, I believe 
that the Third World contributes - and has indeed contributed to -
international legal theory as much as Roth contributes. 
In conclusion, a basic problem with Governmental Illegitimacy is 
that it separates political and economic liberalism in its discussion of 
governmental illegitimacy. This distinction between political and eco­
nomic issues is rather artificial and does not even characterize post­
realist legal thought in American academia. In American academia, 
legal realism has shaken the foundations of the type of conceptualist 
and doctrinaire thought that Roth defends within the context of inter­
national law. Roth's work reveals the degree to which liberal/ 
conservative international legal writing has remained insulated and 
aloof from some of the most significant developments in legal theory 
in the last century. Is such aloofness accidental? Whether accidental 
or not, such aloofness is ill-suited to addressing the challenges associ­
ated not only with neoliberalism or globalization in mainstream par­
lance, but also with issues relating to the Third World. Indeed, my 
Review sought to debunk Roth's simplistic characterization of the 
post-Cold War moment as if it merely could be captured as being a 
clash between universalism and cultural particularism. This is a poor 
15. See Roth, supra note 1, at 2061. 
16. Id. at 2060. 
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rehash of the Eurocentricism that characterizes much of the analysis in 
the book. Instead of seeing the world through this simplistic lens, I 
suggest that the post-Cold War situation is one characterized by the 
recognition of multiple identities and heterogeneity, and the rejection 
of universalist modes of reasoning. Such multiplicity and heterogene­
ity, in turn, can best be appreciated if seen for what these identities 
and, indeed, norms and doctrines of international law are: constructed 
and contingent. The challenge for liberal/conservative approaches to 
international law, therefore, is to engage this postcolonial predicament 
rather than to defend international norms in the abstract, as Roth does 
in his defense of their utility for small states. For these reasons, the 
Third World has a lot to offer the First. Twailing international law 
will surely continue the dialectic that my Review of Roth's book pro­
voked. There is no better way of developing international legal the­
ory, or even addressing substantive questions of international justice, 
than through such a dialogue. That my Review has led to this dia­
logue, as I intended, is therefore a welcome result. 
